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Representational momentum is the tendency to misremember the stopping point of a moving object as further forward in 
the direction of movement. Results of several studies suggest that this effect is typical for changes in position (e.g., 
translation) and not for changes in object shape (transformation). Additionally, the effect seems to be stronger in motor 
tasks than in perceptual tasks. Here, participants judged the final distance between two spheres after this distance had 
been increasing or decreasing. The spheres were two separately translating objects or were connected to form a single 
transforming object (a dumbbell). Participants also performed a motor task in which they grasped virtual versions of the 
final objects. We found representational momentum for the visual judgment task for both stimulus types. As predicted, it 
was stronger for the spheres than for the dumbbells. In contrast, for grasping, only the dumbbells produced 
representational momentum (larger maximum grip aperture when the dumbbells had been growing compared to when 
they had been shrinking). Because type of stimulus change had these different effects on representational momentum for 
perception and action, we conclude that different sources of information are used in the two tasks or that they are 
governed by different mechanisms. 
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Introduction 
When observers are asked to indicate the stopping 
point of a moving object, they typically indicate some point 
further forward in the direction of the (actual or implied) 
motion. This phenomenon is called representational mo-
mentum (Freyd & Finke, 1984; for a review, see Hubbard, 
1995, 2003; for a recent collection of related work, see 
Thornton & Hubbard, 2002). In the first study that 
showed representational momentum (Freyd & Finke, 
1984), observers were presented with three discrete visual 
presentations of a rectangle rotating in the picture plane. 
The observers were asked to remember the position of the 
third item and to indicate whether a fourth rectangle was 
the same as the third or not. Freyd and Finke found that 
the fourth rectangle was more likely to be erroneously 
judged as being the same when it was rotated forward in 
the direction of motion from the true stopping point, ver-
sus the same distance backwards. Since this initial study, 
many other examples of forward displacement have been 
found, using a variety of stimuli, including single translat-
ing objects (Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988), groups of trans-
lating objects (Finke & Shyi, 1988), depth rotated novel 
figures (Munger, Solberg, Horrocks, & Preston, 1999), ar-
ticulating human figures (Verfaillie & Daems, 2002), and 
crowds of human figures (Thornton & Hayes, 2004). In 
addition to implied motion sequences, representational 
momentum has been found with displays involving in-
duced motion (Faust, 1990), smooth continuous motion 
(Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988; see also Kerzel, 2000), and in 
static scenes where motion is only suggested pictorially 
(Freyd, 1983; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000). 
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The ability to find forward displacements across a wide 
range of display types led Freyd (1987) to predict represen-
tational momentum “for any dimension of continuous 
change.” However, almost all of the evidence to date has 
involved either actual or implied motion, that is, a change 
of position over time. Brehaut and Tipper (1996) carried 
out several experiments to see whether they could demon-
strate representational momentum with a completely dif-
ferent form of change. They presented participants with 
objects that changed brightness over time. Instead of repre-
sentational momentum, they found exactly the opposite 
pattern: When the stimulus changed from dark to light, 
participants remembered the last instance of the stimulus 
as darker then it actually was and when the stimulus 
changed from light to dark, they remembered the last 
stimulus as being lighter than it was. This finding led Bre-
haut and Tipper to conclude that representational momen-
tum might be something typical for moving, but not neces-
sarily changing, stimuli. 
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Several recent studies from our lab appear to be consis-
tent with this notion. Visual tasks involving growing cubes 
(Franz, Bülthoff, Fahle, & Thornton, 2001), expressive 
faces (Thornton, 1997), deforming objects (Thornton, 
Vuong, Knappmeyer, & Bülthoff, 2002), and opening or 
closing pliers (Brouwer, Franz, & Thornton, 2003a; Brou-
wer, Thornton, & Franz, 2003b) all failed to provide clear 
evidence of representational momentum; most of them 
showed the opposite pattern. Although these stimuli in-
volved motion of parts of the object, the overall stimulus 
did not change position and may be better described as 
changing identity or transforming rather than as moving. 
Previous findings by Kelly and Freyd (1987) also suggest 
that representational momentum might be typical for mov-
ing rather than for changing stimuli. Specifically, while they 
found representational momentum for coherent changes, 
such as shrinking (receding) and growing (approaching) 
squares, they did not find (strong) representational mo-
mentum for less coherent changes in shape.  
The purpose of the present study was to create a display 
in which the effects of change in position (translation) and 
change in identity (transformation) could be directly com-
pared. To do this we created two types of stimuli that var-
ied in the degree of transformation while leaving most 
other aspects (including the degree of translation) constant. 
One type of stimulus consisted of two spheres that moved 
toward or away from each other; the other consisted of the 
same two spheres but the spheres were connected by a bar 
to form one single, transforming object (“dumbbells,” see 
Figure 1). We used a standard probe task to measure visual 
representational momentum. For the spheres, being two 
separately translating objects, we predict stronger represen-
tational momentum than for the dumbbells, which can be 
seen as a single transforming object. 
Previous studies have also suggested that the mode of 
response can make a difference in judging the final in-
stance of an object. For example, Kerzel (2003) found 
stronger representational momentum when participants 
indicated the last position of a translating disk by pointing 
or by moving a cursor than when they judged the disc’s 
position purely visually. In our previous work, when ob-
servers were asked to reach out and grasp the final instance 
of a transforming object, they opened their hands wider for 
growing or opening objects than for shrinking or closing 
objects (Brouwer et al., 2003a, 2003b; Franz, Bülthoff, 
Fahle, & Thornton, 2001). This behavior contrasted with 
visual tasks on the same displays, suggesting a possible dif-
ference between perception and action in this context. In 
the present work, we also asked participants to grasp the 
final instance of the spheres or dumbbells to further ex-
plore the differential effect of response mode on represen-
tational momentum. 
Methods 
The stimulus consisted of a sequence of 2D rendered 
images of dumbbells (Figure 1A) or spheres (Figure 1B), 
presented on a black background. The dumbbells and 
spheres were presented in two separate experiments, to dif-
ferent groups of participants. In the following, the methods 
will be described for the dumbbells. For the spheres, the 
experiment was exactly the same except for leaving out the 
bar that visually connected the two spheres in the dumbbell 
stimuli. 
Figure 1. Stimuli. A. Dumbbe
ble in the actual stimulus), wA B C
o
 
lls. B. Spheres. C. The white outlines indicate the size and position of the simulated haptic objects (invisi-
hich were exactly the same for the dumbbells and the spheres. 
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General setup and stimuli 
Figure 2 shows a schematic overview of the experimen-
tal setup, which involved stereo-computer graphics 
(OpenGL, SGI Octane II, and Crystal Eye shutter glasses), 
two robot arms (PhantomTM), a monitor, and a mirror. Par-
ticipants were seated on a chair and looked down into the 
mirror through the shutter glasses. The monitor that was 
mounted above the mirror presented the stimuli so that 
they appeared to be on the left of a horizontal plane, at a 
distance of approximately 50 cm from the participants’ 
eyes. 
There were three kinds of (implied) motion of the 
dumbbells; increase, decrease, and static. In the conditions 
“increase” and “decrease,” we presented participants three 
dumbbells in succession. The sequence could either imply 
an increasing distance between the spheres or a decreasing 
distance, in steps of 1 cm. Each dumbbell was presented for 
250 ms, and there was a 250-ms interval in between. In the 
condition ”static,” only one pair of dumbbells was shown 
for 250 ms. We included this condition as a baseline and 
to check for a general decrease in remembered size, which 
appeared to be present in previous studies (Brouwer et al., 
2003a, 2003b; Hayes & Freyd, 2002; Hubbard, 1996; Franz 
et al., 2001). The final distance between the outer edges of 
the spheres could be either 37 mm or 47 mm (“target size”). 
The stimuli were presented blocked for motion type (in-
crease, decrease, or static). Previous studies have shown that 
forward displacement can be more reliably measured under 
these conditions, probably due to the increased predictabil-
ity of the observed sequence (Kerzel, 2002). The order of 
the blocks was randomized. 
Shutter glasses
Monitor
Mirror
2 Phantoms
TM
 
Figure 2. Overview of the experimental setup. The Phantoms
were only used in the grasping task. 
 
Perceptual task 
We used the traditional representational momentum 
probe task to measure perceptual performance. After the 
target pair of dumbbells had disappeared, and a 250-ms 
interval was presented, an additional pair of dumbbells was 
shown for 250 ms. This pair of “comparison” dumbbells 
could be either exactly the same as the target, or 2.5-, 5-, 
7.5-, or 10-mm shorter or longer. The participants were 
asked to watch the whole sequence and to indicate whether 
the comparison dumbbell was different from the target by 
pressing the appropriate button on the keyboard that they 
held on their lap. They were told that the proportion of 
“different” and “equal” responses needed not be the same 
(in fact, the true proportion of “equal” comparison dumb-
bells was 0.11), and that the difference could be very small. 
The comparison dumbbells remained visible until the par-
ticipants responded or until they had been presented for  
3 s. In the latter case, participants received a message that 
they had been too slow and the trial was repeated later.  
Participants practiced 10 trials at the start of each block 
(increase, decrease, and static). After that, they performed 
(2 target sizes × 9 comparisons × 8 repetitions =) 144 ex-
perimental trials. This results in a total of (144 × 3 motion 
types =) 432 perceptual trials for each participant. No feed-
back was given. 
Grasping 
During the grasping task, the thumb and the index fin-
ger of the participant’s right hand were attached to two ro-
bot arms (Phantom TM). The positions of the tip of the 
thumb and the tip of the index finger in space were indi-
cated by two stereoscopically presented digit markers (in the 
form of two small spheres). To start a trial, the participants 
had to bring these digit markers within a starting area that 
was specified by a large sphere. The starting area was about 
20 cm to the right of the dumbbells. If the digits were in 
the correct position, the large sphere disappeared. The par-
ticipants’ task was to press the spheres of the target dumb-
bells together. Figure 1C indicates the relative size and po-
sition of three (invisible) haptic objects. The objects were all 
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2.5-cm high. If participants touched these, or the surface on 
which the dumbbells were lying, the phantoms provided 
resistance to make the dumbbells and the surface appear 
physically present. To press the spheres together, partici-
pants had to move their digits through “force field” objects 
(exerting a constant outward force of 0.8 N) until they col-
lided with a simulated solid object that represented the 
maximally shortened version of the dumbbells. We created 
small gaps between the force fields and the simulated solid 
object, so that the participants did not experience a force 
pushing their fingers back after having succeeded. A suc-
cessful grasp was indicated by the appearance of a pair of 
maximally shortened dumbbells. 
Before starting with the experimental trials of each 
block (increasing, decreasing, and static), participants first 
practiced 10 trials in which the dumbbells remained visible 
all the time. After that they practiced for an additional 10 
to 20 trials in which they were only allowed to start moving 
their hand after the dumbbells had disappeared, as in the 
actual experiment. If participants started moving away from 
the starting position before the dumbbells had disappeared, 
they received a warning that they started too early and the 
trial was repeated later. If the participants did not succeed 
within 3 s of the dumbbells’ vanishing, they were warned 
that they were too slow and the trial was repeated later. For 
each block, there were (2 target size × 40 repetitions =) 80 
experimental trials. This results in a total of (80 × 3 motion 
types =) 240 grasping trials for every participant. 
Participants 
Fourteen right-handed participants performed the tasks 
with the dumbbells. Fourteen new right-handed partici-
pants performed the tasks with the spheres. One partici-
pant of the latter group was excluded from analysis as he 
had profound difficulties with grasping in the virtual setup. 
In each group, seven participants did the perceptual task 
first and seven the grasping. They were paid for their par-
ticipation. 
Data analysis 
Perceptual task 
To estimate the remembered distance between the 
spheres in the perceptual task, we determined the “remem-
bered size.” This was the weighted mean for every partici-
pant for each of the six conditions (three motion types and 
two target sizes). To compute the weighted mean, we 
summed the products of the proportion “equal” responses 
and the distance between the spheres of the comparison 
dumbbells, and subsequently divided this by the total pro-
portion of “equal” responses in that particular condition. 
We performed a repeated measures ANOVA on these re-
membered sizes with motion type and target size as within-
subject factors and task order (whether the perceptual task 
was performed first or the grasping) as a between-subject 
factor. Representational momentum would be indicated by 
a larger remembered size for increasing than for decreasing 
distance between the spheres. 
For each participant, we computed the representational 
momentum effect by subtracting the remembered size for 
the decreasing condition from the remembered size for the 
increasing condition. 
Grasping 
For each grasping trial, we calculated the maximum 
grip aperture (i.e., the maximum distance between thumb 
and index finger during the reach to grasp movement). 
Maximum grip aperture scales linearly with object size 
(Jeannerod, 1981, 1984). We used a repeated measures 
ANOVA with motion type and target size as within-subject 
factors and order as a between-subject factor to test for sig-
nificant effects. Representational momentum would be 
indicated by a larger maximum grip aperture for dumbbells 
that had been increasing than for dumbbells that had been 
decreasing. 
Similar to the perceptual task, we computed the repre-
sentational momentum effect by subtracting the maximum 
grip aperture for the decreasing from that for the increasing 
condition for each participant. 
We took 0.05 as the level of significance. All effects 
with a p < .10 will be mentioned. Mean values of the de-
pendent variables will be presented as ± SEM. 
Results 
Perceptual task 
Figure 3 plots the remembered size as a function of 
motion type and target size for the dumbbells (A) and the 
spheres (B). 
Consistent with representational momentum, the re-
membered size was larger when the stimuli had been in-
creasing than when they had been decreasing for both the 
dumbbells and the spheres. This is reflected by significant 
effects of motion type on the remembered size for both 
kind of stimuli (repeated measures ANOVAs, dumbbells: 
F(2,24) = 8.81, spheres: F(2,22) = 18.37, both p < .01). As pre-
dicted and depicted in Figure 3C, representational momen-
tum was stronger for the spheres than the dumbbells (one-
tailed, independent samples t test, t(25) = 1.82, p = .04). Par-
ticipants remembered the distance between the spheres on 
average as 2.43 ± 0.57 mm larger when they had been in-
creasing than when they had been decreasing. This was 
1.26 ± 0.32 mm for the dumbbells. 
As indicated by Figure 3A and 3B, there was a clear ef-
fect of target size on the remembered size (repeated meas-
ures ANOVAs, dumbbells: F(1,12) = 2120.43, spheres:  
F(1,11) = 9732.41, both p < .01). For the dumbbells, partici-
pants remembered the target size of 47 mm on average as 
being 10.21 ± 0.23 mm larger than the target size of  
37 mm. This corresponds to a slope of 1.021 ± 0.023 for 
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the linear fit, which relates remembered size to object size. 
For the spheres, the slope was 1.020 ± 0.010. 
The repeated measures ANOVA that was performed 
on the remembered sizes of the dumbbells did not reveal 
any other significant effects. For the spheres, there was a 
significant interaction between motion type and size  
(F(2,22) = 10.71, p < .01). The nature of the interaction can 
be seen in Figure 3B; the slope is somewhat steeper for the 
static condition than for the decreasing and increasing 
conditions. Another significant interaction for the spheres 
was between motion type and order (F(2,22) = 5.65, p = .01). 
There seemed to be a stronger representational momentum 
effect for participants who did the grasping task first than 
for participants who did the perceptual task first. In our 
previous work using pliers (Brouwer et al., 2003a, 2003b), 
there was also an interaction effect between motion type 
and order on the remembered size, but this went in exactly 
the opposite direction; participants who did the perceptual 
task first showed representational momentum, whereas the 
others did not. 
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Figure 3. Perceptual task - the remembered sizes for each target
size and motion type. Error bars represent the SEM (partly cov-
ered by the symbols). A. Results for the dumbbells. B. Results
for the spheres. C. Representational momentum (remembered
size for the increasing condition minus that for the decreasing
condition) for dumbbells and spheres. 
 
Most data points in Figure 3A and 3B are below the 
line that indicates veridical performance. This means that 
participants tended to remember the stimuli as smaller 
than they actually were, which is consistent with previous 
findings (Brouwer et al., 2003a, 2003b; Hayes & Freyd, 
2002; Hubbard, 1996; Franz et al., 2001). On average, 
dumbbells were remembered as 1.64 ± 0.16 mm too small. 
For the spheres, this was 0.79 ± 0.29 mm. One-tailed one 
sample t tests indicated that both biases were significantly 
different from zero (t(13) = 10.37, p < .01 and t(12) = 2.69,  
p = .01, respectively). An independent samples t test indi-
cated that the bias was significantly stronger for the dumb-
bells than for the spheres (t(25) = 2.60, p = .02). 
On average, the remembered sizes of the static condi-
tion are in between those of the increase and decrease con-
dition. Paired t tests indicated that the remembered size for 
the static condition was not different from the remembered 
size averaged across the decrease and increase condition 
(dumbbells: t(13) = 1.15, p = .27 and spheres: t(12) = 0.77,  
p = .46). 
Grasping 
For the dumbbells, the average maximum grip aperture 
was 95 ± 4.64 mm. The participants’ averages ranged be-
tween 69 mm and 118 mm. For the spheres, this was  
85 ± 4.65 mm with a range of 67 mm until 124 mm. 
Figure 4 plots the maximum grip aperture as a function 
of motion type and target size for the dumbbells (A) and 
the spheres (B). 
There was a significant effect of motion type on the 
maximum grip aperture for the dumbbells (repeated meas-
ures ANOVA, F(2,24) = 4.12, p = .03) but not for the 
spheres (repeated measures ANOVA, F(2,22) = 0.04,  
p = .96). As indicated in Figure 4C, participants opened 
their fingers on average 5.90 ± 2.32 mm wider when the 
dumbbells had been increasing than when it had been de-
creasing. This is consistent with representational momen-
tum. For the spheres, the maximum grip aperture was 0.57 
± 1.64 mm smaller in the increasing than in the decreasing 
condition, a trend that goes in the opposite direction of 
representational momentum. The difference between these 
effects was significant (independent samples t test,  
t(25) = 2.23, p = .04). 
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For both stimulus types, there was a significant effect of 
size (repeated measures ANOVAs, dumbbells: F(1,12)= 30.86, 
spheres: F(1,11) = 88.62, both p < .01). When grasping 
dumbbells of 47 mm, participants opened their fingers 4.18 
± 0.76 mm wider than when the target size was 37 mm. 
This corresponds to a slope of 0.418 ± 0.076 for the linear 
fit, which relates maximum grip aperture to object size. The 
slope was 0.402 ± 0.042 mm for the spheres. In other 
grasping studies, in which physical objects are grasped, 
these slopes are usually larger (on average 0.82; Smeets & 
Brenner 1999). Our small slope may be due to participants’ 
uncertainty about the object’s size and distance because 
there is less information available about these properties in 
grasping with phantoms in a virtual environment, com-
pared to grasping physical objects in a natural environment. 
In our previous work using cubes (Franz et al., 2001) and 
pliers (Brouwer et al., 2003a, 2003b), in which participants 
also grasped virtual objects by using the phantoms, the ef-
fect of target size was small as well (slopes of 0.38 and 0.32, 
respectively). The difference in slope, together with the 
finding that some subjects find it difficult to use the phan-
toms (see “Participants”), indicates that one should be care-
ful to generalize grasping using phantoms to real grasping. 
Grasping with phantoms may be more like grasping impov-
erished stimuli using tools. However, our present aim is to 
measure representational momentum with a task that is 
more motorlike than visually judging, rather than investi-
gate real grasping. 
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The repeated measures ANOVAs on maximum grip 
aperture did not reveal any other significant effects.  
Figure 4A and 4B show that the average maximum grip 
apertures of the static conditions are in between those of 
the increase and decrease conditions. Paired t tests indi-
cated that the maximum grip aperture for the static condi-
tion was not different from the maximum grip aperture 
averaged across the decrease and increase condition 
(dumbbells: t(13) = 0.53, p = .60 and spheres: t(12) = 0.07,  
p = .95). 
Relation between perception and action 
Figure 5 plots, for each participant, perceptual repre-
sentational momentum against representational momen-
tum in grasping for the dumbbells (A) and the spheres (B). 
A positive value means that the remembered width, or the 
maximum grip aperture, is larger in the increasing than in 
the decreasing condition (i.e., representational momen-
tum). Clearly, there is no (positive) correlation in either of 
the graphs (dumbbells: R2 < 0.01, p > .99; spheres:  
R2 = 0.08, p = .35). 
Figure 4. Grasping - the maximum grip aperture for each target
size and motion type. Error bars represent the SEM. A. Results
for the dumbbells. B. Results for the spheres. C. Representa-
tional momentum (maximum grip aperture for the increasing
condition minus that for the decreasing condition) for dumbbells
and spheres. 
Discussion 
The main findings of the present study are that repre-
sentational momentum is influenced first by the type of 
stimulus change, and second, by the mode of response 
(perceptual or motor). Furthermore, the way in which the 
type of stimulus change affects representational momentum 
depends on whether the task was perceptual or motor in 
nature. More specifically, representational momentum was 
stronger for separately translating spheres than for trans-
forming dumbbells in a visual judgment task. In contrast, 
there was no representational momentum for the translat-
ing spheres, but there was representational momentum for 
the transforming dumbbells in a grasping task. A final in-
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teresting result is that our stimuli were remembered as 
smaller than they actually were. We will discuss these re-
sults in more detail and speculate on explanations below.  
In several previous studies, coherent stimulus changes 
failed to give rise to representational momentum in visual 
tasks. Typically, these studies involved manipulations that 
changed the identity of the stimulus, rather than the posi-
tion. Here we compared memory for the final configuration 
of a changing display when that change either consisted of 
simple translation (spheres) or also involved object trans-
formation (dumbbells). Consistent with the previous stud-
ies, we found that the simple addition of a connecting bar 
– altering a display with two translating spheres into a dis-
play with a single, transforming dumbbell – reduced repre-
sentational momentum. Although weak, the dumbbells still 
gave rise to reliable forward shifts. This result is consistent 
with Kelly and Freyd (1987). One of their stimuli, a rectan-
gular shape that grew or shrank along only one axis, also 
produced a weak but reliable representational momentum. 
Both their stimulus and our dumbbells did not only trans-
form, but also contained a strong translation component. 
Other stimuli, in which there were no (clearly) translating 
components (e.g., the squares changing luminance of Bre-
haut & Tipper, 1996), showed an effect opposite to repre-
sentational momentum. 
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The question arises as to why there would be a stronger 
representational momentum for translating than for trans-
forming stimuli. Several authors suggest that the mecha-
nism leading to the typically observed forward shifts or rep-
resentational momentum might serve to anticipate the fu-
ture position of an object (Brouwer, Middelburg, Brenner, 
& Smeets, 2003; Hubbard, 1998; Kelly & Freyd, 1987; Na-
gai, Kazai, & Yagi, 2002). Thus, representational momen-
tum might be particularly salient when dealing with objects 
that change position over time.  
Another mechanism may try to guard against anticipa-
tion in situations where it would not be appropriate, such 
as when changes have the potential to influence the iden-
tity of an object. This could lead to backward shifts in situa-
tions involving changes to object identity rather than object 
position (e.g., Brehaut & Tipper, 1996). These two mecha-
nisms could be competing in cases where both transform-
ing and translating components are present (cf., competing 
mechanisms proposed by Freyd & Johnson, 1987). 
There was clear evidence for representational momen-
tum with grasping the dumbbell stimuli, as we had ex-
pected from previous studies that showed strong represen-
tational momentum in motor tasks (Franz et al., 2001; 
Brouwer et al., 2003a, 2003b; Kerzel, 2003). Participants 
opened their fingers wider when a pair of dumbbells had 
been growing than when it had been shrinking, although 
we asked the participants to grasp the final pair and pro-
vided the appropriate feedback. Also in line with these pre-
vious studies, representational momentum for the dumb-
bells appeared to be stronger for the motor task than the 
perceptual task. In grasping, the amount of extra grip aper-
ture for grasping increasing dumbbells relative to static 
dumbbells (half of the direction effect, about 3 mm), ap-
proaches the amount of extra grip aperture caused by a 1-
cm increase in size (the size effect, about 4 mm). The step 
size of the inducing growing dumbbells was 1 cm. Thus, the 
size of the effect suggests that participants were aiming to 
grasp a pair of dumbbells that was almost one step further 
in the direction of the change. For visual judgment tasks, 
representational momentum is usually much smaller than 
the step size of the inducing stimuli. 
 
Figure 5. Representational momentum in grasping plotted
against representational momentum in perception. A positive
value means that the effect is in the direction of representational
momentum. Every dot represents the data of one participant. A.
Results for the dumbbells. B. Results for the spheres. 
 
In contrast to the large effect of the direction of change 
in grasping dumbbells, there was no effect of direction at 
all for grasping the spheres. Note again that the spheres and 
the dumbbells were identical in all haptic and visual re-
spects, except the spheres of the dumbbells were visually 
connected by a bar. 
Because grasping and perception produced opposite ef-
fects of type of stimulus change on representational mo-
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mentum, we clearly cannot generalize the hypothesized ex-
planation for the difference between translating and trans-
forming stimuli from the visual task to the motor task. The 
different effect of type of stimulus change on a motor and a 
visual task shows that anticipation in grasping and percep-
tion are not simply governed by the same mechanism or by 
the same visual information. This was already suggested by 
our previous study involving opening and closing pliers 
(Brouwer et al., 2003a, 2003b). In that study, there was very 
little evidence of visual representational momentum, but 
there was representational momentum in grasping. Fur-
thermore, there was no between-subject correlation be-
tween representational momentum measured with the per-
ceptual and the grasping task. However, the dissociation 
found in that study could have been special for cases in 
which there was no visual representational momentum. In 
the present study, visual representational momentum oc-
curred for both the perceptual and the grasping task, but a 
dissociation was still found. 
The separate visual pathways hypothesis (Goodale & 
Milner, 1992) proposes that visual information is processed 
in two cortical streams. The ventral stream processes visual 
information that is used for perceptual identification of 
objects, whereas the dorsal stream processes information to 
serve visually guided action. According to this theory, a dif-
ference between perception and action is not unexpected. 
However, the theory further states that the dorsal pathway 
(i.e., action) is largely resistant to illusions, in contrast to 
the ventral pathway (perception). Studies that support the 
visual streams hypothesis show more accurate performance 
for grasping the center disc of the Ebbinghaus illusion 
(Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995; Haffenden & 
Goodale, 1998) than for visually judging its size, which 
clearly reflects the illusion. The results for the spheres were 
in the direction expected by the visual streams hypothesis. 
In contrast, the pattern found by Kerzel (2003) and by us 
with the pliers and the dumbbells, was exactly the other 
way around: participants were more accurate in the visual 
than in the motor task. We prefer to explain different re-
sults for perception and action by a lack of properly match-
ing the motor task to the visual task (Pavani et al., 1999; 
Franz et al., 2000; Franz, 2001; Franz et al., 2003) and a 
difference in the use of information for the different tasks 
(Smeets, Brenner, de Grave, & Cuijpers, 2002). 
In our pliers study, we found a stronger forward shift 
for closing than for opening pliers. Similarly, Hayes and 
Freyd (2002), who used growing and shrinking squares (or 
approaching and receding squares), found a stronger for-
ward shift for shrinking than for growing squares. To clarify 
whether there was a difference in strength of representa-
tional momentum between the different directions of mo-
tion, or whether there was a general tendency to remember 
things as too small that, together with effects of direction of 
motion, determined the final remembered size, we followed 
the example of Hubbard (1996) and included a static con-
dition in this study. Consistent with Hubbard’s results, we 
found that the average remembered size for the static con-
dition was smaller than the actual target size, and that the 
remembered size of the static stimuli was in between that of 
the decreasing and increasing stimuli. Thus, the remem-
bered size seems to be determined by the actual target size, 
representational momentum, and a general bias to remem-
ber the objects as a certain amount too small. This bias 
could be related to boundary extension (Intraub, 1997; 
Hubbard, 1996). Boundary extension is the tendency to 
remember a scene as if the limits of view have been ex-
tended outward, which would be, in the experiments men-
tioned, equivalent to remembering objects as smaller than 
they were. This tendency was stronger for the dumbbells 
than for the spheres. If participants attended more to the 
whole stimulus in the case of the dumbbells and to only 
one sphere when they were separate objects, this is not a 
surprising difference. Boundary extension that affects the 
whole dumbbell gives rise to dumbbells that are remem-
bered as smaller than they were, but boundary extension 
that affects only one sphere gives rise to a sphere that is 
remembered as smaller than it was, but not to a (inward) 
change of position of the sphere. 
In summary, we conclude that visual representational 
momentum is stronger for objects changing position than 
for transforming objects. Measuring representational mo-
mentum with a motor task gives the opposite result. This 
opposite effect of object change indicates that different in-
formation is used in judging stimuli for a visual task than 
for a motor task, or that different mechanisms process in-
formation for these two types of tasks. A clear goal for fu-
ture studies will be to try to specify more precisely the na-
ture of these differences. For example, examining eye 
movement patterns or assessing attentional deployment 
during grasping and perceptual judgments may help to 
shed light on the type of information being extracted. Simi-
larly, such measures could also be used to investigate possi-
ble strategy differences adopted by observers when faced 
with the spheres or the dumbbells. Our use of blocked de-
signs may have increased the tendency for observers to 
adopt specific strategies. Randomly presenting spheres or 
dumbbells may be a useful way to manipulate the use of-
strategies or more generally explore the impact of increased 
uncertainty (Kerzel, 2002). 
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